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RECENT DECISIONS
fourteen, and fifteen years respectively. Why condemn the plaintiff
for laches, or for "slumbering upon his rights" when his legal lethargy
was superinduced by the clever concoction of the defendant? The
learned court denied rescission because awarding the plaintiff the pur-
chase price and interest without diminution for the value of the use of
the piano for two years, would work too great a hardship on the
defendant. But rescission is an equitable remedy for the benefit of
the defrauded, and it would be more equitable to rescind the trans-
action, rather than to thrust the seven-year-old piano on the unwill-
ing shoulders of the guiltless plaintiff. "A party seeking rescission
must put the other party in status quo as nearly as possible. But this
rule is wholly an equitable one; impossible things which do not tend
to accomplish equity in the particular transaction, are not required." 12
A. F.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ADEQUATE REMEDIES-EQUITY.-
Petitioner, insurance company, issued to defendant, a corporation en-
gaged in repairing vessels, a policy of liability insurance in July, 1924.
Defendant requested that the insurance date from June 15, 1924, and
fraudulently concealed from petitioners that an accidental injury to a
vessel had occurred on June 24, 1924. Defendant on September 24,
1932 made claim under the policy for the above mentioned loss. Ac-
tions were begun on November 7, 1932 to reform the policy so as
to exclude liability for loss resulting from the accident on the grounds
that defendant's failure to disclose facts which it was under a duty to
disclose vitiated the policy even if there were no intent to defraud.
Defendant's contention that the action was barred by the six-year
Statute of Limitations was not sustained by the court which held
that the availability of the defense of fraud was not the equivalent
of an affirmative remedy in an action at law and thus the case did
not fall in the category of concurrent jurisdiction. On appeal, held,
affirmed. Since the only adequate affirmative remedy lay in equity,
the ten and not the six-year Statute of Limitations was applicable.
Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Morse Dry Dock and Repair
Company, 270 N. Y. 86, 200 N. E. 589 (1936), aff'g, 244 App.
Div. 780, 272 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1st Dept. 1934).
THE UNIFORM SALES AcT § 69; see Lawley v. Park, 138 Fed. 31, 70 (C. C. A.
1st, 1905) (yacht returnable, although seriously injured, due to defective con-
struction material); Rosenthal v. Rambo, 165 Ind. 584, 76 N. E. 404 (1905)(horse returnable even though in a worse condition than when sold, contrary
to the provision in the contract, that it may not be returned unless it is in
as sound a condition as when sold); Smith v. Hale, 158 Mass. 178, 33 N. E.
493 (1893).
"Sloane v. Shiffer, 156 Pa. 59, 64, 27 Atl. 67 (1893).
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In cases where a complete and adequate remedy at law exists,
the six-year Statute of Limitations is applicable' and the time can-
not be enlarged 2 by proceeding in equity under the ten-year statu-
tory period.3 When the jurisdiction of equity has been challenged
because of an alleged adequate remedy available at law, courts have
held that such adequate remedy deprives the plaintiff of relief in
equity. 4 But where the relief sought in equity is challenged 5 because
of an alleged outlawing of the action in that the remedy at law was
not utilized for- six years, the courts hold that the remedy or relief
at law must be an affirmative one in order for the six-year period
to apply. 6 The rule is well established that the Statute of Limita-
tions does not apply to defenses at law; 7 the purpose of the Statute
of Limitations is to establish a period within which a cause of action
in law or in equity must be prosecuted. Thus, the remedy at law
being only a defense, there is no limitation to apply in equity other
than the proper ten-year limitation period. The court in the instant
case followed the above reasoning though basing its decision largely
on its reluctance to further limit the application of the ten-year limi-
tation by denying equity jurisdiction because a defense at law had
been available for six years.
A. O'D.
REAL PROPERTY-RECORDING AcT-BURDEN OF PRooF.-Plain-
tiff's grantor unconditionally executed a deed to plaintiff and delivered
it in escrow, to take effect upon grantor's death. This deed was not
IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48: "any action to procure a judgment on the
grounds of fraud must be commenced within six years after the cause of
action has accrued."
'Rundle v. Allison, 34 N. Y. 180 (1866); Keys v. Leopold, 213 App.
Div. 760, 210 N. Y. Supp. 406 (lst Dept. 1925), rev'd on other grounds,
241 N. Y. 189, 149 N. E. 828 (1925).
' N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 53: "an action, the limitation of which is not
specifically prescribed in this article must be commenced within ten years
after the cause of action accrues." See also Dodds v. McColgan, 125 Misc.
405, 211 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1925); Ford v. Clendenin, 155 App. Div. 433, 137
N. Y. Supp. 54 (2d Dept. 1911); Gilmore v. Ham, 142 N. Y. 1, 36 N. E.
826 (1911); Pitcher et al. v. Sutton, 238 App. Div. 291, 264 N. Y. Supp.
488 (4th Dept. 1933); Clarke v. Gilmore, 149 App. Div. 445, 133 N. Y.
Supp. 1047 (1st Dept. 1912).
'Town of Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462, 20 A. L. R. 495 (1895);
Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McCarthy, 245 App. Div. 784,
280 N. Y. Supp. 948 (3d Dept. 1935); New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Sisson, 19 F. (2d) 410 (W. D. Pa. 1926).
'As in the instant case, the sole defense of the Statute of Limitations
concedes that equity has jurisdiction but alleges that the action is barred.
Bidiwell & Banta v. Astor Mutual Insurance Co., 16 N. Y. 263 (1857).
'Clarke v. Boorman's Executors, 85 U. S. 493, 21 L. ed. 904 (1875);
Pattir v. Walker, 159 Misc. 339, 287 N. Y. Supp. 806 (1936).
'Maders v. Lawrence, 49 Hun 360, 2 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1888); People
v. Faxon, 111 Misc. 699, 182 N. Y. Supp. 242 (1920).
